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Sales Responses to Recalls for Listeria monocytogenes:  
Evidence from Branded Ready-to-Eat Meats 
 
Introduction 
A large number of studies have addressed the impact of unfavorable product 
safety information on the demand for food commodities.  The foodborne hazards 
examined to date include those with chronic and long-term consequences such as 
pesticide residues (Brown; Swartz and Strand; Johnson; Smith van Ravenswaay and 
Thompson; Liu, Huang, and Brown) or more recently concerns over Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (Verbeke and Ward; Burton and 
Young).  Studies also address unfavorable information related hazards that pose 
immediate health effects.  These include foodborne pathogens (Dahlgren and Fairchild; 
Brown and Folsom; Richards and Patterson) and paralytic shellfish poisoning (Wessells, 
Miller, and Brooks).  In most cases, unfavorable information is measured in terms of 
media coverage of the foodborne hazard in question and/or as a binary variable 
controlling for periods of time affected by an outbreak or food scare.   
A main question addressed by these studies is to what extent do markets respond 
to unfavorable product safety information.  Another concern raised in many of these 
studies is that “innocent” producers also suffer losses in the wake of a food scare because 
consumer confidence in the safety of their commodity is diminished.  For example, 
Swartz and Strand suggested that government provided information assuring consumers 
that available supply is safe could lower the magnitude of producer welfare losses.     2
Later findings do suggest that positive information either in the news media 
(Smith, van Ravenswaay, and Thompson; Liu, Huang, and Brown) or through advertising 
expenditures (Verbeke and Ward) can play some role in reassuring consumers, but the 
impact of positive information is considerably smaller than that of negative information.
1  
Verbeke and Ward, for example, estimate that positive advertising has an impact that is 5 
times smaller than negative information.  Richards and Patterson explain the 
disproportionate impact of negative information in terms of attribution theory and note 
that given a concave utility function that incorporates information about product 
attributes, the utility change resulting for negative information is larger in absolute value 
than the utility change resulting from positive information.   
  One source of information that has not been addressed in earlier studies is 
information provided through branding.  A well-developed theoretical literature suggests 
that for goods with experience attributes, investments in brand equity provide signals to 
consumers with less than perfect a priori information about product quality (Nelson; 
Klein and Leffler; Kihlstrom and Riordan; Ippolito).
2  The essential logic is that brand 
identity is a bond that the firm forfeits in the event that it provides the consumer with less 
than the expected level of quality (see Ippolito for a discussion of the bonding nature of 
brand signals).  Brands can be effective in this capacity because brand awareness is firm 
specific, has value, is costly and usually can only be developed over time.  Kirmani and 
                                                 
1 Smith, van Ravenswaay, and Thompson construct an index of positive media coverage for use in their 
study, but specification tests they conducted suggested a model incorporating negative information only 
was superior.  They do, however, compare the impact of positive information to previously published 
findings on the impact of advertising to conclude that the impact of negative information is large in 
magnitude than the impact of positive information. 
2 Following Nelson, experience attributes refer to those that cannot be determined by the consumer pre-
sale.  Examples include taste, texture, and for purposes of the present study, product safety.    3
Rao provide a review of empirical studies in both marketing and economics and find 
empirical evidence for the signaling ability of brands and advertising.   
Invariably, the products examined in earlier studies of food scares involve food 
commodities with little or no brand identities, e.g., milk, fresh seafood, strawberries, and 
fresh meat and poultry products.  In these cases, it is likely that a consumer with less than 
perfect information would err on the side of caution in the wake of a food scare by 
avoiding the product or decreasing the amount of consumption.  With branded products a 
food scare that can be directly linked to one or more brands the effect of avoidance costs 
are less clear.   
  This study seeks to build on earlier work by examining whether brands can 
ameliorate spillover effects to firms not directly implicated in a food safety incident.  The 
analysis presented here examines frankfurters, a highly branded ready-to-eat (RTE) meat 
product.  The food safety events analyzed are recalls for Listeria (L.) monocytogenes.  L. 
monocytogenes is an environmental pathogen that can contaminate a wide variety of food 
products.  Those who become ill from consuming foods contaminated with this pathogen 
experience symptoms ranging from a mild and flu-like to serious involving neurological 
infections, spontaneous abortion, and death.  Foods at greatest risk for contamination 
with this pathogen include raw milk products, RTE meats, and soft cheeses.  In 
December 1998 an outbreak of Listeriosis was attributed to frankfurters and luncheon 
meats and resulted in recall of 35 million pounds of these products.  This was and 
remains the largest meat and poultry recall in history.  Several other recalls of various 
sizes followed in 1999 and 2000, the period analyzed in the study.   
  The objectives of this study are to:   4
(1) Quantify sales declines for frankfurter brands implicated in a recall for L. 
monocytogenes. 
(2) Determine whether frankfurter brands, not directly implicated in a recall, 
experience sales declines. 
(3) Provide information on brand recovery following a recall for L. monocytogenes. 
 
Data  
Retail sales data are from Information Resources, Inc.’s (IRI) InfoScan data for 
the frankfurters category.  These data reflect supermarket sales in 64 US markets.  
Observations provided in the Infoscan data are market level aggregates.  Each 
observation reflects a given brand sold in a given market over a four-week period.  The 
data used for this study include 28 quad-week observations for hundreds of brands of 
frankfurters over the period of November 1998 to December 2000.  The specific InfoScan 
measures used in this study are volume sales (lbs), dollar sales, percent all commodity 
volume weighted distribution (a measure of a brand’s distribution exposure within a 
market), and percent of sales in the presence of merchandising activities such as features 
and/or displays.  The retail price per pound was obtained by dividing dollar sales by 
volume sales.  Data for recall events were obtained from the USDA’s Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS).  FSIS records provide the date of the recall, the reason for the 
recall, the product recalled, the brand names implicated in the recall, and the geographic 
region affected by the recall.  These records also provide the size of recalls in terms of 
pounds subject to recall and pounds actually recovered.   5
The recall data were matched to the InfoScan data by brand, by market, and by 
date.  Table 1 provides the number of recalled brands identified in each of the 64 markets.  
Some issues in matching the two data sets are as follows: 
1.  Brand names listed in the InfoScan data were sometimes more specific than those 
listed in the FSIS records.  For example, if FSIS records indicated that a given 
brand was recalled, that brand might appear several times in the InfoScan data 
with qualifiers such as “Old Fashioned”, “Home style”, “Plump and Juicy”, and 
the like.  When this type of sub-branding was apparent and prior to identifying 
matches with the FSIS data, volume sold was recomputed as the sum over the 
various sub-brands and weighted averages were computed for the price, 
merchandising, and distribution variables using the sales of each sub-brand as the 
weight. 
 
2.  In some cases, brand names in the FSIS records were not in the InfoScan data.  
Most, if not all, of these cases appear to be product recalled from foodservice and 
institutional channels or private label brands not specifically identified by name in 
the InfoScan data. 
 
3.  When the geographic scope of the recall was less than nationwide, FSIS records 
usually indicated one or more states that were affected by the recall.  In these 
cases, implicated brand names sold in markets other than those within the 
geographic purview of the recall were not considered to have been recalled for 
purposes of database preparation.  For example, if a given brand was implicated   6
in a recall that only affected product shipped to Ohio, that brand was considered 
to be a recalled brand in the Cleveland, Toledo, Cincinnati, and Columbus 
markets but was considered to be a non-recalled brand in other market. 
 
4.  A meat recall is initiated by a processing establishment and is supervised by the 
FSIS.  In frankfurter production, co-packing is commonplace and one 
establishment may produce products for several brand names.  It is not 
uncommon for a single FSIS recall to affect more than one brand.   
 
5.  The entry and exit of brands within markets was fairly commonplace over the 
study period.  To account for sporadic distribution among some brands, we 
removed brand/market combinations that did not have positive sales during all 28 
quad-week periods.  We also eliminated brand/market combinations that showed 
a greater than 500 percent increase in volume sold during any period.   
 
In total 9 recalls from the FSIS records were successfully matched to brands in the 
InfoScan data.  Table 2 reports the  dates of these recalls, their size, and the number of 
brands and markets affected by each recall.  In total, there were 166 brand/market time 
series that were affected by at least one recall over the study period.  Only one brand was 
twice implicated.  Once in recall #1 and then later in recall #6.  There was a great deal of 
heterogeneity among markets in terms of the brand offering.  In many cases a leading 
brand in one market was not even distributed in others.  Consequently the number of   7
brand market series affected by a given recall reported in table 2 will generally not be the 
product of brands affected and markets affected by the recall.   
 
The sales impact of recalls 
  To estimate effects of individual recalls we estimate a system of seemingly 
unrelated regressions for each of the 64 markets.  Each system has a number of equations 
equal to the number recalled brands in the market (table 1) plus one additional equation 
for an aggregate non-recalled brand
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Explanatory variables are
*
ijt X , a row vector measuring percent changes in demand 
variables that include: percent change in own price, change in own merchandising 
intensity, change in the brand’s distribution within the market, and percent change in 
market expenditures for frankfurters.  The 
s
ijt D  are binary variables equal to equal to one 
if the brand was implicated in a recall s periods ago.  In the aggregate non-recalled brand 
equation, 
s
ijt D  takes the value of 1 if there was a recall affecting any brand in the market s 
periods ago.  The vector  ij θ and scalars  , ,
1 0
ij ij γ γ  and 
2
ij γ  are parameters to be estimated.  
                                                 
3 The aggregate non recalled brand reflects the sum of volume sold for all non-recalled brands in the 
market, with price and other demand variables calculated as a weighted average.   8
Note that both the dependent variable and the demand variables in 
*
ijt X  are normalized to 
have a percent change interpretation.  This normalization facilitates a comparison across 
brands that vary greatly in terms of sales volumes. 
After estimating the parameters of the 64 SUR systems, one system for each 
market, we aggregate over the estimates of  , ,
1 0
ij ij γ γ  and 
2
ij γ   to obtain an estimate of the 
average cumulative effect of a given recall.  Let r = 1, 2, …., 9 index the recalls observed 
over our study period and reported in table 2.  The immediate impact of the r
th recall is 
obtained by averaging the 
0
ij γ  over brands and markets that were affected by r
th the recall.   
To obtain estimate of the average cumulative effect one four week period and two four 
week periods after the recall, estimates of 
1
ij γ  and 
2
ij γ  that correspond to the r
th recall were 
included in the average as well.   
To conduct hypotheses tests about the average immediate and cumulative impacts 
of the r
th recall we first compute the variance of aggregations involving the j
th market 
using the variance covariance matrix of the parameter estimates of the SUR system as: 
(3)  jr j jr jr s k V k′ =
2 , 
where  jr k  is a vector with elements taking the values of zero or one.
4  Values of one are 
placed strategically to include the needed variance and covariance terms for estimates of 
the 
s
ij γ  that correspond to brands affected by the r
th recall.  The standard error for the 
average effect of a recall is then computed by combining the 
2
jr s  across markets as 
follows: 
                                                 
4 
1 ] ) ( [
− ⊗ ′ = j j j j X I Σ X V , where Σj is the cross model inverse covariance matrix, and Xj is a block 
diagonal regressor matrix with 
*
ij X  on the diagonal blocks.     9









Note that in estimating the average effect of a recall, we assume independence across 
markets.  We do not, however, assume independence between brand equations from the 
same market.   
  Table 3 presents the aggregated cumulative brand sales impact.  The immediate 
sales drop attributed to a recall ranged from -7.7 percent to -43.4 percent.  With exception 
of three small recalls (recalls #3, #5, and #7), the average sales drop is statistically 
significant.  However, there is not necessarily a clear relationship between recall sizes 
(either in terms of pounds subject to recall or pounds actually recovered) and magnitude 
of sales losses.  For instance, recalls #4 and #8 involved 2.1 million and 15,000 pounds, 
respectively and caused sales drops that are in line with losses resulting from the two 
large 35 million pound recalls.  The average impact computed over all recalls in the 
sample shows a 22 percent drop in sales during the 4 week period of the recall.   
Table 3 provides some evidence about when brand recovery might start to occur 
following a recall.  The cumulative impact during the period of the recall and 4 weeks 
following suggests that sales continued to decline for the two large recalls (#1 and #2) 
and for recalls #8 and #9.  Aside from some of the very small recalls, only brands 
affected by recall #4 show evidence of recovery during the 4 week period immediately 
following the recall.  During the next 4 weeks (roughly 2 months after the recall 
occurred) there is evidence that sales did start to recover.  The three period cumulative 
impacts resulting from the two largest recalls are statistically significant at only the 10 
percent level.  Only recall #8 continues to show a highly significant sales drop two 
periods after the recall.  The averages over all recalls suggests an overall pattern wherein   10
recalled brands continue to lose sales during the 4 weeks after the recall period but start 
to recover approximately two months after the recall.   
There is no evidence that non-recalled brands suffer collateral damage when 
competing brands are implicated in a recall.  If anything, there is evidence that non-
recalled brands increase sales during and immediately after a recall.  On average, sales of 
non-recalled brands increased 2.70 percent during the four weeks of a recall and were 
4.05 percent higher than pre-recall levels during the next four week period.   
 
Further analysis of brand recovery 
One advantage of the above specification is that coefficients of the model are 
allowed to be different for across brands and markets and aggregations conducted post-
estimation can provide information on whether some recalls have bigger impacts than 
others.  However, the shortness of the available time series and accompanying degree of 
freedom problems does not permit a satisfactory examination of longer-term effects of 
recalls.  To examine the issue of brand recovery in more detail we pool the data series for 
both recalled and non recalled brands.  The idea is to construct treatment groups 
consisting of (1) brands implicated in a recall situation, and (2) non-recalled brands in 
markets that were affected by a recall.  The pooled dataset consists of 42,066 
observations.   
As in the previous specification, the dependent variable is the percent change in 
quantity sold and explanatory variables include percent change in own price, change in 
own merchandising intensity, change in the brands distribution exposure within the 
market, and percent change in total expenditure on frankfurters in the market.  Degrees of   11
freedom are not a concern with the pooled data set and additional regressors are included 
to control for seasonality, the percent change in the weighted average price of all 
competing brands, and the percent change in the weighted average merchandising 
intensity of all competing brands.  As in the previous specification, a series of binary 
variables, 
s
ijt D , are included and equal 1 if brand i in market j was subject to a recall s 
periods ago.  A second series of binary variables is included in the pooled regression and 
are set equal to 1 if the brand was not implicated in a recall but was sold in a market that 
experienced a recall s periods ago.  The number binary recall variables included in the 
regression model was based on Akaike’s information criterion.   
Table 4 presents coefficient estimates for the demand variables in the pooled 
regression model.  The dataset is largely cross-sectional and heteroskedasticity is a 
problem.  Test statistics reported in Table 4 are based on White’s consistent estimates of 
the variance covariance matrix.  The signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance 
associated with the coefficients for the demand variables are largely as would be 
expected.  The only demand variable that is statistically insignificant is that associated 
with changes in the weighted average price of competing brands.   
The estimated coefficients and t ratios for the recall variables are reported in 
figure 1.  Because the dependent variable is expressed as a percent change measure, the 
estimated coefficients for the recall variables can be interpreted as the period-to-period 
growth rate in sales for brands following a recall and can be used track whether sales 
revert to pre-recall levels over time.  Figure 1 presents indexes for recalled brands and 
non recalled brands, both arbitrarily set to a value of 100 in the period before a recall.  As 
in the disaggregate analysis presented above, results from the pooled regression model   12
suggest an average 22.7 drop in sales during the 4 weeks of a recall.  Sales begin to 
recover 8 to 12 weeks after a recall has occurred and approach pre-recall levels 16 to 20 
weeks after the recall.  Again, there is no evidence that non-recalled brands sold in 
markets that experience a recall suffer sales losses.  There is actually statistical evidence 
that non-recalled brands increase sales after a recall has occurred.   
 
Discussion 
The finding that recalled brands experience sales declines following a recall is not 
unexpected.  Common sense suggests that in the vast majority of recall cases could only 
hurt a brand’s sales.  However, the estimated magnitudes of sales declines –  on average, 
sales of recalled brands fell 22 to 27 percent during the four to eight week period after a 
recall – is interesting and suggests very real economic incentives to minimize the 
potential for a contamination incident involving L. monocytogenes and thereby lower the 
risk of  a recall situation.   
One unresolved problem is determining what proportion of the observed sales 
declines are attributable to the consumer avoiding recalled brands and what proportion is 
attributable to product being removed from distribution and thus not being accessible for 
consumer purchase.  Unfortunately, there was no way to isolate these two effects given 
the level of detail provided in FSIS records on recall activity.  The records provide 
information about the total size of a recall, the total pounds actually recovered from 
distribution, and brand names effected.  However, because many recalls affect multiple 
brands there is no way to attribute how many pounds of a single brand were recovered.  
The problem is further complicated by the fact that many recalls affected product sent to   13
both food service as well as to retail channels and in some cases the total volume subject 
to recall included other types of RTE meats in addition to frankfurters.   
While a temporary reduction in supply is certainly one cause of the decline in 
sales, the brand recovery pattern is consistent with at least some degree of consumer 
aversion to recalled brands.  On average, sales do not revert to pre-recall levels for four to 
five months after a recall is initiated.  This exceeds the shelf-life of frankfurters and it is 
unlikely that sales would remain low much longer than one to two months because 
frankfurters intended for commerce were unavailable for purchase.  
The most interesting finding is that non recalled brands did not experience sales 
losses in the wake of a recall.  If anything, non recalled brands experience an increase in 
sales when a competing brand is implicated in a recall.  This suggests that if recalls do 
provide product safety information to consumers, consumers view the problem to be a 
brand problem and not a category problem.  One interpretation of this finding is that 
brand equity does provide a signal to the consumer about product safety and can insulate 
firms from an industry wide safety problem.   
   14
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Table 1: Number of Recalled Brands Identified in Each IRI Market 
Market Brands  Market Brands Market Brands Market  Brands
Albany 2  Grand  Rapids  4 Mississippi  2 Roanoke  7
Atlanta 6  Green  Bay  1 Nashville  5 Sacramento  1
Baltimore  1  Harrisburg  3 New England  3 Salt Lake City  1
Birmingham  7  Hartford  5 New Orleans  2 San Antonio  2
Boise  1  Houston  2 New York  5 San Diego  1
Boston 2  Indianapolis  2 Oklahoma  2 San  Francisco  1
Buffalo 2  Jacksonville  3 Omaha 1 Seattle  2
Charlotte  5  Kansas City  3 Orlando  3 South Carolina  8
Chicago 2  Knoxville  6 Peoria  2 Spokane  1
Cincinnati  1  Little Rock  2 Philadelphia  3 St Louis  2
Cleveland 2  Los  Angeles  1 Phoenix  1 Syracuse  2
Columbus 1  Louisville 3 Pittsburgh 2 Tampa  Bay  3
Dallas 4  Memphis  2 Portland  2 Toledo  1
Denver 1  Miami 2 Providence  2 Tulsa 2
Des Moines  2  Milwaukee  3 Raleigh  5 West Texas  2
Detroit 4  Minneapolis  2 Richmond  2 Wichita  1
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1  22/12/98   35 mil.   5.92 mil.  2 63 81 
2  22/01/99   35 mil.   8.43 mil  6 32 44 
3  05/02/99        1,545         1,507  1 1 1 
4  13/10/99   2.1 mil.     377,922  1 10 10 
5  18/11/99        1,020            650  1 1 1 
6  24/03/00      34,500            200  1 30 30 
7  24/05/00        2,870         2,335  2 1 2 
8  29/05/00      15,000         5,856  2 5 10 
9  03/10/00    900,000     409,620  3 10 17 
   18







N  Recall Period  Recall Period and 
4 weeks after 
Recall Period and 
8 weeks after 
1  22/12/98   35 mil.   5.92 mil.  51 -14.57 ***  -19.23 ***  -9.71 * 
   (-3.77) (-3.17) (-1.45)
1b 22/12/98  30 -12.54 ***  -7.19 *  -4.34  
   (-4.23) (-1.55) (-0.74)
2  22/01/99   35 mil.   8.43 mil  44 -34.49 ***  -50.44 ***  -27.19 * 
   (-3.45) (-3.57) (-1.59)
3  05/02/99           1,545           1,507  1 -4.75   55.46   82.40  
   (-0.12) (1.00) (1.18)
4  13/10/99   2.1 mil.       377,922  10 -43.35 ***  -30.73 *  23.44  
   (-3.26) (-1.55) (0.98)
5  18/11/99           1,020              650  1 -12.71   -15.55   -29.64 * 
   (-1.10) (-0.95) (-1.41)
6  14/05/99         16,392         10,290  Estimated with Recall 1b       
7  24/05/00           2,870           2,335  2 -7.66   117.18 103.64
   (-0.48) (5.24) (3.69)
8  29/05/00         15,000           5,856  10 -31.90 ***  -40.16 ***  -34.81 *** 
   (-4.55) (-4.15) (-2.99)
9  03/10/00       900,000       409,620  17 -14.55 *  -43.86 ***  -16.32  
   (-1.48) (-3.17) (-0.93)
Additional Aggregations 
All  Recalls  166 -22.10 *** -27.69 *** -11.76 ** 
   (-6.79) (-5.88) (-2.08)
Non-recalled  brands  64 2.70 *** 4.05 *** 2.34 ** 
  (3.92)  (4.87)  (2.31)  
* Asterisks indicate significance: *** at the one percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.  Hypotheses  
   tests are based on a t-test (in parenthesis)  with 19 degrees of freedom and except for non recalled brands are one tailed.  19
Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Control Variables 
Variable Estimate t  ratio
Intercept 3.089 3.864
%∆ Price  -1.300 -30.564
%∆ Merchandising  0.996 51.557
%∆ Distribution  2.283 28.006
%∆ Expenditure  0.613 23.000
(%∆ Price) × (∆ Merchandising)  -0.020 -12.059
%∆ Price of competing brands  0.031 0.715
%∆ Merchandising of competing brands  -0.643 -18.547
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a. t ratios are in parenthesis.   